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International Agreement Obligations
After the Soviet Union's Break-up:
Current United States Practice and Its
Consistency with International Law
ABSTRACT

Focusing on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the author explores
whether international law is consistent with respect to the succession of
states to treaty obligations. This Note examines whether the republics of
the former Soviet Union are held bound by treaties made by the U.S.S.R.

The Note discusses whether the current practice of the United States
regarding treaties with the former Soviet Union is consistent with international law. The author concludes that internationallaw in this area
is not well settled. The United States treatment of the former Soviet republics is consistent with some sources of law, but not others. Finally, this
Note concludes that the United States policy has promoted stability in the
region and has established internationallaw in the process.
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INTRODUCTION

Several states, most notably the Soviet Union, recently have undergone
dissolution. This restructuring raises the question whether, under international law, newly created states inherit the treaty obligations of their
predecessors. This Note explores this question by examining the restructuring of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian
Federation. In this context, perpetuation of treaty obligations depends
primarily on two factors: first, whether the Russian Federation is the
same legal entity as the Soviet Union or whether each of the fifteeen
former Soviet Republics is a new and independent state, and second,
what theory of international law should be applied.
This Note examines the primary international law theories regarding
the effect of state succession on treaty obligations. It then discusses the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties; the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debt; the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States; and the past practices of states as possible
sources of relevant international, law. Next, this Note explains how treaties establishing membership in international organizations differ from
other treaties. It then examines the short history of the former Soviet
Union since its break-up and whether the United States is holding Russia and the other former Soviet republics responsible for the obligations
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of treaties the Soviet Union made. It also discusses how Russia and the
other republics have gained membership in international organizations.
Next, the Note considers whether current practice is consistent with international law.
Finally, this Note concludes that (1) current practice regarding the
Russian Federation's obligations; (2) with the exception of Russia, the
United States generally has not followed customary international law
with respect to the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Republics; (3)
the United States policy regarding the Baltic states is consistent with
customary international law only because the United States never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union; (4) the
United States policy of continuity of treaty obligations has promoted stability; and (5) the actions taken concerning the obligations of the former
Soviet Union have changed customary international law of treaty obligations of successor states.
II.

BACKGROUND-THEORIES AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW

A.

Theories of Succession in InternationalLaw

When one government succeeds another international law provides
that the change in government does not affect the state's rights, capacities, and obligations.' When one state succeeds another,2 however, it is
1. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 266-67
(2nd ed. 1987). The United States has long accepted this rule and has applied it since the
United States and French revolutions in the 1700s. See 2 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1528
(2d rev. ed. 1947). "No principle of international law can be more clearly established
than this: That the rights and obligations of a nation, in regard to other states, are

independent of its internal revolutions of government." Herbert A. Wilkinson, The
American Doctrine of State Succession, 4 JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD. HIsT. & POL. SCI.

97 (1934).
2. One definition of state succession is "the factual situation which arises when one
State is substituted for another in sovereignty over a given territory." D.P. O'CONNELL,
1 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1967) [hereinafter STATE SUCCESSION]. Another definition is "a change in the possession of competence to conclude treaties with respect to a given territory." Sir Humphrey Waldock,
Special Rapporteur on the Succession of States and Governments in Respect of Treaties,
in his first report to the International Law Commission of the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/202, para. 2(a), draft art. 1. Yet another is "the replacement of one State
by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory." Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 2, para. 1(b), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.80/31 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1490 (1978) [hereinafter V.C.S.S.].
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less clear whether the new state assumes the rights, capacities, and obligations of the former state.

Although customary international law3 does not provide a general rule
concerning state succession to treaty obligations, it acknowledges two
doctrines. The first and oldest doctrine, universal succession, seeks legal
continuity, whereas the second, the clean slate doctrine, leaves the succes4
sor state in a legal vacuum.
The doctrine of universal succession resolves the problems that inevitably arise with political change by adopting the Roman idea of continuity of legal personality upon death.' Under Roman law, rights and
duties of the deceased passed to the heir.' Because these legal rights and
duties arose from a conception of natural rights, they continued to exist
despite the change in the identity of their bearer.7 Similarly, the doctrine
of universal succession regards the personality of the state as immutable,
irrespective of changes in government, and neither revolution nor cession
of territory affects the fundamental character and constancy of that personality.8 Under this doctrine, the successor state is the direct heir to the

State succession can occur in a variety of ways. States unify into federations or combine with other states. States secede and become new states. Former colonies secede and
become newly independent states. Finally; states can dismember completely and give rise
to newly sovereign entities. See 1 STATE SUCCESSION, supra at 4. Complete extinction of
a state with no legal successor has not occurred, although it is theoretically possible such
as through the sinking of an island state or through nuclear warfare. LORD ARNOLD D.
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 589-90 (1961).
3. Customary law derives from state practices such as diplomatic acts; official statements of policy, either unilateral or in cooperation with other states; and acquiescence in
the acts of other states. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 282, 288 n.30 (1988). Usually a
considerable period of time must pass before a practice becomes custom. See id. (citing
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62 (1962)). However, customary law may
emerge in a fairly short time if the practice has widespread acceptance. If important
states do not adopt a practice, the practice may fail to become general customary law
although it might be "particular customary law" for the states that adopt it. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102 cmt.
b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4. Rosalie Schaffer, Succession to Treaties: South African Practice in the Light of
Current Developments in InternationalLaw, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 593, 594 (1981).
5. 1 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 9.
6. Id. Under Roman law, an heir was considered the same person as the deceased in
all aspects of property ownership. If two groups of people formed a union, the rights of
each group did not die but were shared by the new group. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE
BELLI AC PAciS LIBRI TRES 315, 319 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).

7.
8.

1 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 9.
Id.; see also Schaffer, supra note 4, at 594.
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predecessor state's legal relationships, and the treaties of the predecessor
devolve upon the successor.9 Other states may insist that the successor
fulfill existing obligations and may condition recognition of the new state
on the continuance of the legal relationship between them."0
The clean-slate doctrine, which emerged during the latter half of the
nineteenth century, rejects all of the major premises of the universal succession theory." Under the clean-slate doctrine, law is the expression of
the sovereign's will.' 2 When there is a change of sovereignty, the will of
the former sovereign ceases to exist, and the legal order of the state collapses.' 3 The resulting legal vacuum lasts until the successor establishing
its sovereignty and dictates its own will.' 4 Any continuity is purely voluntary and occurs only at the will of the successor state."
The traditional clean-slate doctrine often does not reflect the practical
reality of a succession. Although a successor state does not inherit the
sovereignty of its predecessor, international law does impose on the successor state some responsibility for the obligations of the predecessor.' 6
Generally, rights and duties devolve upon a successor state.' 7 Under a
"modified clean-slate" theory, which takes into account the realities of
international law, newly independent states are not required to honor
treaties entered into by their predecessors, but they may choose to suc-

9. LUNG-FONG CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 15
(1974).
10. 1 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 14. The theory of universal succession,
which was prevalent until the middle of the nineteenth century, promoted stability in
European international affairs during times of war and independence movements. States
generally assumed that treaties would remain in effect regardless of any boundary
changes. Id. at 11; see also OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTER123 (1972).
11. The clean-slate theory arose because the actual practice of the states was not in
accord with the theory of universal succession. Unfortunately, the new theory did not
accurately describe actual practice but rather represented a swing to the opposite extreme
of the theory it replaced. Schaffer, supra note 4, at 595.
12. Id.
13. Id. Under the clean-slate doctrine, the ruler had independent sovereign power
and was the embodiment of the state. There was no reason for the successor to bear the
responsibilities of the prior state because there was no legal tie between the two. See 1
STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 15.
14. Schaffer, supra note 4, at 595.
15. Id. Under the clean-slate doctrine, territory and sovereignty are not transferable,
and, therefore, the entire notion of state succession is fallacious. Id.
16. Id. at 596.
17. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955).
NATIONAL TREATIES
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ceed to any or all treaties to which the predecessor was a party.' 8
1. Personal versus Dispositive Treaties
Underlying both doctrines of treaty succession is a historical distinction between personal and dispositive treaties. Personal treaties are contractual in nature and, therefore, depend on the continued existence of
the parties.' 9 If one state disappears completely through annexation, dismemberment, or some other means, then that state is unable to fulfill the
obligations of the treaty, and the treaty expires; however, if the state
merely loses some of its territory, it retains its identity, and the treaty
survives. o
Dispositive treaties create rights in the land and survive all changes in
sovereignty."' The legal effect of a dispositive treaty is similar to that of
a covenant running with land; the territory gains permanent status independent of the personality of the state exercising sovereignty. 22 Dispositive treaties are more similar to a conveyance than to an agreement because the restrictions they impose create equitable property in the
beneficiary state and limit the sovereignty of any state over the territory. 23 Thus, a successor state may receive the property only as conveyed,
with any limitations included.2 4 Examples of dispositive treaties are treaties of cession, boundary treaties, peace treaties,2 5 and treaties that "pro-

18.
19,

See Schaffer, supra note 4, at 597, 624 n.168.
D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 15 (1956) [hereinafter LAW

OF STATE SUCCESSION].

20. Id.
21. Id. at 49; McNAIR, supra note 2, at 256. The distinction between personal treaties and real treaties which grant a permanent and indefeasible status on a territory was
first drawn by Vattel:
We must not confound those treaties or alliances which, since they impose the
obligation of repeated acts on both sides, can not remain in force except through
the continued existence of the contracting powers, with those contracts by which a
right is once for all acquired, independently of any subsequent acts of either party.
EMERRICH DE VATTEL, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS 178 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 191'6).
22. See LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 19, at 49-50. Treaties of this type
survive regardless of what government or state has control over the land. Dispositive
treaties create rights and servitudes which limit sovereignty. The servitudes are of two
types: universal servitudes, which create a benefit for many states, and particular servitudes, which create a benefit for one state. Id. at 54, 56.
23. Id. at 49-50.
24. Id.
25. McNAIR, supra note 2, at 256. "[Wlhen a State cedes a piece of territory over
which it has granted to another State a right of transit or a right of navigation on a river,
or a right of fishery in territorial or national waters, it cannot cede that territory unen-
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vide for the neutralization or demilitarization of a region" or grant
"rights of way over territory."26
B.

The Vienna Convention On Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties

1. Identifying Sources of International Law Using the V.C.S.S. for
Analysis
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth the
customary international law on the law of treaties and other international agreements that regulate states' behavior.2 The Convention, however, explicitly excludes codification of treaty law governing state succession.2 8 Filling the void created by that exclusion is the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (V.C.S.S.),29
which the International Law Commission adopted in 1978.
The V.C.S.S. will enter into force after fifteen states deposit an instrucumbered by that obligation." Id. at 656.
26. LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 19, at 49. For a more complete discussion of servitudes, see 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR STUDENTS 23536 (1971).
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 145. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/C.3927 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] was signed by the United States on April
24, 1970, but the Senate has not ratified it. See Robert E. Dalton, InternationalAgreements in the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 153, 153 n.2 (1984). Nonetheless,
the United States and other nonparties to the Vienna Convention accept the treaty as
law. See id. at 155. The Vienna Convention is designed to govern all other international
agreements that regulate states' behavior in fields such as commerce, human rights, and
environmental protection. Frankowska, supra note 3, at 285. The Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States generally accepts the Vienna Convention as a codification of customary international law governing international agreements
even though the United States has not ratified the Convention. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 145.
28. "The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that
may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States." Vienna Convention, supra
note 27, art. 73, 8 I.L.M. at 707.
29. V.C.S.S., supra note 2. For history of the treaty, see [1974] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 157, U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/275, A/CN.4/278, and A/8710/Rev. 1.
The V.C.S.S. was adopted on August 23, 1978, by a vote of 82 in favor with 2 abstentions. From that date until February 28, 1979, the Convention was open for signature by
the Conference in Vienna and subsequently remained open at United Nations Headquarters in New York until August 31, 1979. See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to
which the United States is Not a Party, 25 I.L.M. 1640 (1986) [hereinafter Recent
Actions].
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ment of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the

United Nations.30 Although the V.C.S.S. is not technically in force, it
nevertheless may be binding as international law."1 Its authority as international law depends on whether the treaty embodies a previously existing rule or practice of international law, 2 whether judges look to its
articles as a source of law, 3 3 and whether the current practice of states is
in accord with the treaty.34
International agreements can create new customary international law
that binds all states regardless of whether those states participated in the
negotiations or became parties to. the agreement.3 For example, the

30. V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 49, 17 I.L.M. at 1514. As of this writing, 19 states
have signed the Convention, and only 9 have ratified or acceded to it. Angola, Brazil,
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Iraq, Madagascar, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sudan, Uruguay, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, and Zaire have signed the treaty. In addition, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Iraq, Morocco, Seychelles, Tunisia, and Yugosolavia have ratified or acceded to the
treaty. Recent Actions, supra note 29, 25 I.L.M. at 1640.
31. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs the International Court of Justice to apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1(a)-(d), 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
Article 38 is considered the most authoritative statement on the sources of international
law. See Frankowska, supra note 3, at 285 n.21.
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
identifies the following as sources of international law: custom, international agreements,
and common general principles. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 102.
32. Although the treaty is not yet in force, comparable international law exists

outside of the V.C.S.S. Article 7 recognizes this:
Without prejudice to the application of any of the rules set forth in the present
Convention to which the effects of a succession of States would be subject under
international law independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only in
respect of a succession of States which has occurred after the entry into force of the
Convention except as may be otherwise agreed.
V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 7, para. 1, 17 I.L.M. at 1492.
33. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Jonathan I. Charney, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary InternationalLaw, 61 WASH. L. REv. 971, 971 (1986). There is even some
support for the view that an international agreements not yet in force can be considered
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leaders of the United States and Soviet Union signed the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 2), but the parties never ratified the
treaty and, therefore, never converted it into a legally binding instrument. 36 Nevertheless, in May 1986, the United States charged the Soviet
Union with violating the treaty and terminated it,37 thereby treating this

unratified agreement as a binding commitment.
The greatest number of clearly articulated international legal rules
appears in treaties, draft conventions of the International Law Commission (ILC), and resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 8 The General Assembly created the ILC to codify preexisting customary law 39 and to develop general international law.4 Although the
ILC does not distinguish in the V.C.S.S. between the articles constituting
codification of existing customary law and the articles constituting development, the introductory declaration4 1 states that the treaty will reflect
existing international law.42
Past state practice, especially by major world powers, provides additional support for the position that the theories in the V.C.S.S. embodies
prevailing principles of international law.43 Scholars observe states' practice over time to identify emerging international law,4 4 but they dispute

current international law. Id.

36.

SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES

1945-1986, 120

(1989). Governments will adhere to unratified treaties if they believe that the national
interest so requires and if they can accomplish adherence without additional internal
approval. Id. at 120-21.
37. Id. at 120.
38. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
86 (1971).
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 208, reporter's note 4.
40. Georges Abi-Saab, The Development of InternationalLaw by the United Nations, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 227 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987).
41. "The States Parties to the present Convention . .. [are] [clonvinced, in these
circumstances, of the need for the codification and progressive development of the rules
relating to succession of States in respect of treaties as a means for ensuring greater
juridical security in international relations." V.C.S.S., supra note 2, 17 I.L.M. at 1488.
42. "[Tjhe declaration may ... be viewed as a form of state practice confirming the
customary international law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 102 reporter's note 5.
43. See examples of practice given, supra in text accompanying notes 85-111.
44.

D'AMATO, supra note 38, at 7.

The most widely quoted formula for proof of a customary rule of law was articulated
by Judge Manley 0. Hudson. He said the formula consists of:
[1] concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation

falling within the domain of international relations; [2] continuation or repetition
of the practice over a considerable period of time; [31 conception that the practice is
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the amount of time needed to establish a custom.4 5 Furthermore, the
state's size and power partially determine the time required. The acts of
a major power, sophisticated in international law, may be more significant than those of a smaller, less sophisticated state.46 Similarly, more
recent acts will be more persuasive then earlier ones in determining if
custom exists.

47

2. Theories of Law in the V.C.S.S. Treating Different Instances of
Succession
The V.C.S.S. 8 divides succession of states into three categories: when
part of a territory cedes to another state,49 when states secede to become
independent,5" and when parts of a territory unite or separate to form

required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law; [4] general acquiescence in the practice by other states; [5] the establishment of "the presence of each
of these elements ...

by a competent international authority."

Id. at 7 (quoting [1950] 2 Y.B.

INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16).
"Opinio juris" is the requisite legal conviction states must have in addition to their
practice to qualify that practice as evidence of customary international law. The fact that
a convention of 79 states passed the drafted treaty may reflect the opinio juris of the
states. This legal conviction also emerges in practice when a state does n6t act according
to its best interest but acts according to a norm of the international community. See
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 37.
45. Some scholars say that the time needed to form a custom varies "according to the
nature of the case," while others urge that "a single precedent could be sufficient to
create international custom." D'AMATO, supra note 38, at 58 (quoting Sir Humphrey
Waldock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 44 (1962),
and Gilberto Amado, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N 5).
46. "[W]hat gives a nation its voice in forming custom is not necessarily its military
might or the amount of real estate it possesses, but rather its degree of sophistication in
international law." D'AMATO, supra note 38, at 96; see also CHARLES DE VISSCHER,
THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (1957). The acts of the
United States are more persuasive than the acts of less powerful states as evidence of the
formation of custom. D'AMATO, supra note 38, at 97.
47. D'AMATO, supra note 38, at 97.
48. The V.C.S.S. only applies to treaties concluded between states. Article 3 of the
V.C.S.S. states "[T]he present Convention does not apply to the effects of a succession of
States in respect of international agreements concluded between States and other subjects
of international law." V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 3, 17 I.L.M. at 1491.
49. Id. part II, art. 15, 17 I.L.M. at 1496.
50. See id. part II-IV, arts. 15-38, 17 I.L.M. at 1496-1511. The complete definition

of newly independent state in the V.C.S.S. is "a successor State the territory of which
immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the
international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible." Id. art. 2, para.
I(f), 17 I.L.M. at 1490.
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different states. 5 Part II of the V.C.S.S. provides that when there is
partial cession of a state's territory, the treaties of the predecessor state
cease to be in force with respect to that territory, and the successor state's
treaties are extended to it. 52 Part III of the treaty applies the clean-slate
53
doctrine when states become newly independent:
A newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or to become
a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the
succession of States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to
which the succession of States relates. 4
Part IV of the treaty applies the universal succession theory5 5 for the
unification and separation of states. When two or more states unite to
form one successor state, any treaties in force at the time of succession
will remain in force with respect to that territory unless the parties agree
otherwise. 6 When parts of a state separate to form successor states, treaties continue to be in force in each successor state, regardless of whether
the predecessor state continues to exist.5 7 If the treaty was binding on a
geographic area which did not constitute the predecessor's entire territory, the treaty will bind only the successor state which has control over
that area.5 8 If a state continues to exist after part of its territory secedes,
the predecessor's treaties will remain in force in the remaining territory
unless the parties agree otherwise. 9

51.

Id. part IV, arts. 31-38, 17 I.L.M. at 1506-11.

52.

V.C.S.S. Article 15 provides as follows: "When part of the territory of a State

•.. becomes part of the territory of another State: (a) treaties of the predecessor State
cease to be in force in respect of the territory." Id. art. 15, 17 I.L.M. at 1496.
53. In fact, part III codifies the clean-slate doctrine. Id. part III, arts. 16-30, 17
I.L.M. at 1496-1505. A problematic aspect of the V.C.S.S. has been differentiating be-

tween newly independent states that fall under Part III and those that have seceded in a
political dismemberment and fall under Part IV of the Convention. The commentary to
the V.C.S.S. acknowledges the difficulty of determining when states may treat as a newly
independent state a separated territory which becomes a sovereign state. See 2 UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION

CIAL RECORDS

OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES: OFFI-

53 (1978) [hereinafter U.N.

CONFERENCE].

54. V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 16, 17 I.L.M. at 1496.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
56. V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 31, 17 I.L.M. at 1506.
57. Id. art. 34(1)(a), 17 I.L.M. at 1509.
58. Id. art. 34(1)(b), 17 I.L.M. at 1509. The treaty will not remain in force if the
states agree otherwise. Id. art. 34(2)(a), 17 I.L.M. at 1509.
59. Id. art. 5, 17 I.L.M. at 1492. Successor states may participate in treaties that
were not in force or were signed and subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval if the
predecessor state was a contracting party. The successor states must give notice of their
intentions to the other participating treaty states. Id. arts. 36-37, 17 I.L.M. at 1510-11.
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Of course, states may agree to terminate treaty obligations that would
presumptively continue. Either party may claim as a ground for treaty
termination that there has been a fundamental change of circumstances."0 One example of this ground is where it appears from the
treaty or some other source that the treaty's current application would be

incompatible with the overall object and purpose of the treaty or would
radically change the conditions of its operation. 61
The V.C.S.S. codifies the theory of dispositive treaties, stating that a
succession of states does not affect treaty-established boundaries6 2 or obligations and rights that restrict land use. 3 The only remaining question
centers on what rights or obligations attach to the territory. No matter
how dramatic the political changes within the various territories, a state
may not invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for
terminating a boundary treaty.6 4
C.

The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debts

The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts6" (V.C.S.S.P.) is the most comprehensive
60. Under article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the change
must have been of a fundamental character, must have been unforeseen, the circumstances must have been "an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by
the treaty," and the effect of the change must radically change the extent of the obligations of the party invoking the change as a ground for termination. Vienna Convention,
supra note 27, art. 62, 8 I.L.M. at 702.
61. The V.C.S.S. embodies the same grounds of fundamental change of circumstances as the Vienna Convention. See V.C.S.S. supra note 2, art. 18(3). For similar
wording see V.C.S.S. arts. 15(b), 17(2), 19(3), 27(5), and 30-37.
62. "A succession of States does not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a
treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a
boundary." Id. art. 11, 17 I.L.M. at 1494.
63. A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) obligations relating to the use of any territory, or to restrictions upon its use,
established by a treaty for the benefit of any territory of a foreign State and considered as attaching to the territories in question;
(b) rights established by a treaty for the benefit of any territory and relating to the
use, or to restrictions upon the use, of any territory of a foreign State and considered as attaching to the territories in question.
Id. art. 12(1), 17 I.L.M. at 1494-95.
64. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27.
65. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts (V.C.S.S.P.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983), reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 306 (1983). The Convention was adopted on April 7, 1983, and was opened for
signature the following day. The United States has not signed this Convention, nor have
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articulation of international law in the area of state succession and
debt."' Articles 40 and 41 are particularly relevant to the debt issues of
dissolving states. Article 40 articulates the policy that when parts of the
territory of a state separate and form a new state, the debt of the predecessor passes to the successor state in equitable proportion, taking into
account the related property interests that the successor state receives
along with the debt. 7 Although this article appears to apply when the
separating parts of the predecessor state form a new state, paragraph (2)
limits its applicability to instances where the separating part of a predecessor state unites with another existing state. 68 Article 41 utilizes the
same formula for passing debt in equitable proportions to a successor
state when a state dissolves.6 "
Articles 40 and 41 do not provide for debt succession in the instance of
dismemberment of portions of a state while the original state continues
in existence. Most importantly, the V.C.S.S.P. places a premium on any
agreement reached between the predecessor and successor state, 0 but indicates that without such an agreement, some other equitable division
71
should be made.

any other major industrialized states. The signatories include Algeria, Argentina, Egypt,
Niger, Peru, and Yugoslovia. No states have ratified the Convention. Recent Actions,
supra note 29, at 1640.
66. For a comprehensive discussion of the V.C.S.S.P., see P.K. Menon, The Succes-

sion of States and the Problem of State Debts, 6 B.C.

THIRD WORLD

L.J. 111 (1986).

67. Article 40 of the V.C.S.S.P. states:
When part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that State and form a
State, and unless the predecessor State and the successor State otherwise agree, the
State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor State in an equitable
proportion, taking into account, in particular, the property, rights and interests
which pass to the successor State in relation to that State debt.
V.C.S.S.P., supra note 65, art. 40, para. 1, 22 I.L.M. at 324.
68. Id. art. 40, para. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 324 ("Paragraph 1 applies when part of the
territory of a State separates from that State and unites with another State.").
69. Article 41 entitled "Dissolution of a State" states:
When a State dissolves and ceases to exist and the parts of the territory of the
predecessor State form two or more successor States, and unless the successor
States otherwise agree, the State debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the
successor States in equitable proportions, taking into account, in particular, the
property, rights and interests which pass to the successor States in relation to that
State's debt.
Id. art. 41, 22 I.L.M. at 324.
70. Id. arts. 40, 41, 22 I.L.M. at 324.
71. Id. The rules embodied in these articles have been criticized as being impractical.

If the predecessor state and successor state are unable to reach an agreement there is no

provision for how the "equitable proportion" will be determined. P.K. Menon, supra
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The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States

The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Restatement) reflects customary international law. Although the Restatement is not formally binding, 2 it may effectively bind practices of
the United States government. 3
Section 210 of the Restatement incorporates much of the V.C.S.S 4
but divides succession into three categories that are somewhat different
than those in the V.C.S.S." The Restatement focuses on partial cession,
total absorption of a state, and the creation of a new state from the territory of another.7 6 The Restatement refers to partial cession as the "moving treaty-frontier rule"" and, like the V.C.S.S., treats the predecessor
state's treaties as no longer being in force and extends the successor's
treaties to cover the territory." The next category focuses on the situa-

note 66, at 140.
72. Karl M. Meessen, Special Review Essays, The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 433, 435 (1989). The
Restatement reflects international law as scholars have interpreted it.
73. The Restatement gives evidence of the law that domestic courts look to for guidance. Id. at 434. The Restatement's importance outside of the United States emerges
when the United States government has a dispute with a foreign government. The Restatement will be taken as an indicator of United States practice, and foreign governments will rely on the Restatement when it supports their case. This will make it difficult for the United States to argue a position contrary to what the Restatement
articulates. Id. at 435; see also A.L.I. ANN. REP. 34 (1987) (reviewing the frequency
with which United States federal and state courts cited the new Restatement during the
first year subsequent to adoption).
74. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 208 reporter's note 4.
75. This section is entitled "State Succession: International Agreements." Id. § 210.
See reporter's notes accompanying this section, where comparisons are made between the
V.C.S.S. and United States law.

76.

Id. § 210.

77. Id. § 210(1) cmt. a.
78. Section 210(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States reads:
(1) When part of the territory of a state becomes territory of another state, the
international agreements of the predecessor state cease to have effect in respect of
that territory and the international agreements of the successor state come into
force there.
Id. § 210(1). Under United States domestic practice, there is no need for the Senate's
consent to bring a treaty into force between the United States and the successor states
that arise out of any secession or dismemberment. Id. § 210 cmt. h. Acceptance of the
new state's duties and obligations is not a new agreement under United States law, it is
an extension of the old agreement.
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tion in which one state absorbs another state completely."9 The international agreements of the absorbed state terminate and the absorbing
state's agreements become effective in the territory. 0 The third category
incorporates the modified clean-slate theory for situations in which part
of a state secedes to become a new state. 1 According to the Restatement,
the new state does not succeed to any treaties of the predecessor state
unless the state fulfills two conditions. 2 First, the new state must indicate explicitly or implicitly a desire to adopt the treaty, and second, the

other parties to that treaty must acquiesce. 8 The Restatement applies
the modified clean-slate principle to both newly independent states and
to states separated through secession.84
E. The Past Practice of States as Evidence of Custom
1. The Effect of Secession, Political Dismemberment, and Federation
on Personal Treaties
As a general principle, when a state fractionalizes through cession or
secession and the predecessor state retains an international personality,
the predecessor's treaty obligations survive.8 5 Conversely, the new inde79. Id. § 210(2). A third-party state may refuse to recognize the absorption of territory and treat its agreements made prior to absorption as continuing in effect. This was
the United States approach with respect to the treaties it made with the Baltic states
before their annexation into the Soviet Union. See id. § 210 cmt. e.
80. Id. Section 210(2) reads:
When a state is absorbed by another state, the international agreements of the
absorbed state are terminated and the international agreements of the absorbing
state become applicable to the territory of the absorbed state.
The comments accompanying section 210 explain that absorption of a state is very similar to the merger of two or more states into a federal union, implying that this section
would be applied in the instance of a unification. Id. § 210 cmt. c. There does not
appear to be any V.C.S.S. equivalent to this category describing the merger of states into
a union. See V.C.S.S., supra note 2, arts. 31-33, 17 I.L.M. at 1508-09 (dealing with

unification of states).
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210(3).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 210 cmt. f. Like the V.C.S.S., the Restatement upholds dispositive and
boundary treaties as binding on all parties notwithstanding other express articulations of

law. Compare id. § 210(4).with V.C.S.S., supra note 2, arts. 11-12, 17 I.L.M. at 149495.
85. An example of evidence that the predecessor state has retained some international
personality is the condition in which governmental and legal organizations concern one
portion of the surviving territory. See LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 19, at 31.
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pendent states are not bound by any of the treaties of their predecessor,
except for dispositive treaties.86 Nevertheless, the new state may choose

to assume treaty obligations in return for recognition by other states or
87
for other political considerations.
Political dismemberment involves the destruction of a political state
and the formation of several new states within the same territory. 88
There are varying degrees and differing manners of political dismemberment. 89 On one end of the spectrum is a dissolution of a union of fairly
autonomous states.9" The next position is the breakup of a centralized
state into the original parts that formed it." At the other end of the
spectrum is an integrated state that breaks into its constituent parts and
then later into more fragmented portions of those parts. 2
The legal community generally does not allow the extinguishment of
states without some other entity taking responsibility for the predecessor's actions 93 thereby promoting international stability. When a union
of fairly autonomous states dissolves, the resulting states continue to
abide by treaties the union made because most treaties are compatible
with the state of affairs after the dissolution.94 If a bilateral treaty ex-

86. McNAIR, supra note 2 at 601; see also 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at
88.
87. For example, the United States did not succeed to the treaty obligations of Great
Britain, but Great Britain kept all of its treaty obligations with other states upon the
secession of the United States from its territory. See McNAIR, supra note 2 at 601.
88. Id. at 591.
89. 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 164.
90. Id. An example is the 1829-31 break-up of a union called Colombia into the
states of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador. See id. at 165-67.
91. Examples of this are the dismemberments of the United Arab Republic and the
Federation of Mali. Id. at 169-72.
92. McNAIR, supra note 2, at 606. One example is the 1919 breakup of the AustroHungarian Empire when the link between the two monarchies split and then each of the
two states divided even further into smaller states. Fragmented elements then fused to
make Czechoslovakia. Other fragments fused with dismembered elements of other states
to form Poland, and part of the territory ceded to the existing states of Romania and
Yugoslavia. See 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 164, 178-82.
93. See 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 4-6.

94. Id. at 165. The V.C.S.S. position is in accord with some other historical examples of dissolution of unions such as those of Norway and Sweden. When those states
dissolved their union in 1905, both states notified third states that they considered themselves severally bound by the treaties entered into by the union unless the treaty was
made specifically to apply to only one of the two lands. LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION,
supra note 19, at 44-45. The V.C.S.S. position is also in accord with the dissolution of
the union of Iceland and Denmark. Upon the dissolution of their union in 1944, Great
Britain informed Iceland that it regarded all treaties made "by or on behalf of Iceland"
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isted between the union and another state before the dissolution, then
there is a rebuttable presumption that after the dissolution the bilateral
treaty would remain in effect between all the constituent parts of the
union and the third state.9 5 This presumption is rebuttable more easily if
"the field of power affected by the treaty was one within the reserved
competence of the central government" and was not within the control of
the members of the union.96
When a centralized state breaks into several parts, the new states must
abide by the treaties made during the existence of the union. 97 The reasoning is as follows:
When a union of two or more [s]tates dissolves so that the several constituent elements become fully sovereign while the central entity disappears the
problem is different from that arising from independence or secession, inasmuch as there is no surviving holder of rights and obligations, yet the
real beneficiaries of these rights and bearers of the corresponding obligations occupy its place ...

there is a functional devolution in the perform-

ance of legal actions from the central to the local authorities.98
In the extreme case of an integrated state dissolving into constituent

parts that subsequently subdivide even further, the resulting fragmented
during the Union to be still in force. Iceland was in agreement with this position. Id. at
45-46.
95. See 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 165. For example, in the case of the
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919, Austria continued to be
bound by the treaties of the dual monarchy, even though its territory was vastly diminished. Id. at 178-79. On the other hand, the new states, such as Czechoslovakia, in spite
of being located within a portion of the territory of the old Empire, did not have to fulfill
the treaty obligations of the Empire. Id. at 179-80. Poland was "reestablished" as a state
and was also given a clean slate in the matter of treaties with the option of accepting
treaty obligations as the price of recognition by other states. McNAIR, supra note 2, at
604. The Restatement is in accord with this result. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,

§ 210.
96. 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 165. This would be a good argument for
the individual new states arising from the former Soviet Union to use in the instance that
they did not want to adhere to treaties made by the Soviet Government. The republics
could argue that the central Soviet government had the power to make treaties and the
individual republics did not have a true democratic opportunity to give meaningful input
or to stop ratification of treaties made under the Soviet government. One of the few

examples of a union dissolution involved New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, which
were united from 1819 and 1829 under the name of Colombia. Between 1829 to 1831
the union dissolved, and Great Britain's legal advisors agreed that the three states inherited the treaty obligations of the former union. McNAIR, supra note 2, at 606-07; LAW
OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 19, at 43-44.
97. See 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 169-72.
98. Id. at 164-65.
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states start with a clean slate. If there is any semblance of the former
state that may carry on its legal personality, however, the state presumptively survives and assumes the treaty responsibilities of the predecessor
state . 9
The V.C.S.S. rejects the concept of a continuum of autonomy or
amount of international personality different parts of the state enjoyed
before the dismemberment which would then dictate policy on treaties. 10
Commentators have stated specifically that this type of differentiation is
neither relevant nor necessary. 1°1 Today, every dissolution of a state
which results in the emergence of a new state should receive the same
treatment regarding the continuance of treaties.
In cases involving independent states joining to form a federation, the
individual treaties of the member states will remain in effect. 102 Unless
the states agree that one member of the union will make all the treaties
for the union or that a centralized authority will preempt all treaties, the
individual parties forming the union are free to negotiate the distribution
03
of power and the role of the union structure.1

2. The Effect of Decolonization on Personal Treaties
Most examples of recent state succession arise from this century's
decolonization movement and the resulting formation of newly independent states. These cases necessarily raise the question of whether newly
independent states must abide by the treaties of their colonial predecessors once they have gained independence or whether they will enjoy
clean slates. Most newly independent states assert the clean-slate doctrine,10 4 but in practice, only one state has ever denounced completely
the treaties made by its predecessor state. 10 5
Many of the former British colonies accepted succession to all treaties

99. See id. at 178-79.
100. 3 U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 53, at 94.
101. Id.
102. See generally MCNAIR, supra note 2, at 617-22 (providing examples of unitary
states forming unions and the British Government's reaction to the situations).
103. For example, when Denmark and Iceland became a union of states, the agreement of union stipulated that Iceland would accept all of Denmark's foreign affairs
agreements and that Denmark would continue to make decisions regarding Iceland's international relations. Id. at 620.
104. Schaffe , supra note 4, at 624 n. 168. For a discussion arguing that the cleanslate doctrine is the most widely accepted concept in practice, see YILMA MAKONNEN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA 250, 491 (1983).
105. 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 113. In 1950, Israel took the position
that it had succeeded to no British treaties.
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administered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations °6 or to all
treaties in general 0 7 upon gaining independence. The newly independent states would often achieve this by entering into a "devolution agreement" whereby they agreed before gaining independence to accept assignment of the treaty rights and obligations of Great Britain.' 8
Other newly independent states have sought a middle ground between
accepting all or rejecting all obligations and treaties, choosing instead to
abide by their predecessors treaties for a set period, after which time the
treaties were terminated. 9 Some newly independent states have found

106. These states include Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Malaya (Malaysia), Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Id. at 114.
107. These states include the Congo and Madagascar. Id.
108. CHEN, supra note 9, at 21-22; see also Schaffer, supra note 4, at 593, 597. The

V.C.S.S. rejects the notion that a successor state will possess obligations and rights of the
predecessor state based solely on a devolution agreement. Article 8 of the V.C.S.S. states:
"Notwithstanding the conclusion of such a [devolution] agreement, the effects of a succession of States on treaties which, at the date of that succession of States, were in force in
respect of the territory in question are governed by the present Convention." V.C.S.S.,
supra note 2, art. 8, 17 I.L.M. at 1493.
109. This procedure, known as the "Nyerere Doctrine," emerged when the Prime
Minister of Tanganyika sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
declaring that his state would abide by the terms of all treaties of its predecessor, but
only for a period of two years, at the end of which the treaties would terminate unless
the parties otherwise agreed. 2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 116; Schaffer,
supra note 4, at 602. The text of the letter read as follows:
The Government of Tanganyika is mindful of the desirability of maintaining to
the fullest extent compatible with the emergence into full independence of the
State of Tanganyika, legal continuity between Tanganyika and the several States
with which, through the actions of the United Kingdom, the territory of Tanganyika was prior to independence in treaty relations. Accordingly, the Government of
Tanganyika takes the present opportunity of making the following declaration:
As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the United Kingdom on behalf
of the territory of Tanganyika or validly applied or extended by the former to the
territory of the latter, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to continue to
apply within its territory, on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of all such treaties
for a period of two years from the date of independence (i.e. until December 8,
1963) unless abrogated or modified earlier by mutual consent. At the expiration of
that period, the government of Tanganyika will regard such of those treaties which
could not by the application of the rules of customary international law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated.
The Government of Tanganyika is conscious that the above declaration applicable to bilateral treaties cannot with equal facility be applied to multi-lateral treaties. As regards these, therefore, the Government of Tanganyika proposes to review each of them individually and to indicate to the depositary in each case what
steps it wishes to take in relation to each such instrument-whether by confirmation of termination or confirmation of succession or accession. During such interim
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that taking a middle ground regarding possible treaty obligations gave
them an opportunity to form closer diplomatic ties by negotiating treaty
rights and obligations on a one-on-one basis.11 °
The United States has taken a political approach rather than relying
on the prior practice of other states. Upon the decolonization of African
states, for example, whether or not a devolution agreement or unilateral
declaration was in place, the United States endeavored to establish understandings with each of the new states to determine which treaties
11
would remain in force.
F. Treaties EstablishingMembership in InternationalOrganizations
International law governing treaty succession does not apply to treaties
concerning membership in international organizations." 2 Rather, the
constitution and rules of each international organization determine how

a state succeeds to membership in the organization."' The V.C.S.S. specifically states that the Convention does not apply to treaty sections concerning acquisition of membership." 4 As a general rule, international
organizations require that successor states apply for membership." 5
The practice of the United Nations demonstrates that when two members form a federation, their continued participation in the United Naperiod of review any party to a multi-lateral treaty which has prior to independence been applied or extended to Tanganyika may, on a basis of reciprocity, rely
as against Tanganyika on the terms of such treaty.
UNITED NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON THE SUCCESSION OF STATES

177-78 (1967), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/14, reprinted in Schaffer, supra note 4, at
602-03; see also CHEN, supra note 9, at 22. The V.C.S.S. rejects the argument that these
unilateral declarations alone can create rights and duties for the successor state. V.C.S.S.,
supra note 2, art. 9, 17 I.L.M. at 1493-94.
110. Other newly independent states that have used unilateral declarations similar to
the Tanganyika declaration include Uganda, Botswana, Lesotho, Nauru, Kenya, and
Malawi. See [1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/214. See generally
2 STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 2, at 116-22; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210
reporter's note 3.
111. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210 reporter's note 3.
112. V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 4, 17 I.L.M. at 1491-92.
113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222 cmt. b.
114. Article 4 of the V.C.S.S. states:
The present Convention applies to the effects of a succession of States in respect

of:
(a) any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization without prejudice to the rules concerning acquisition of membership and
without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization.
V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 4, 17 I.L.M. at 1491-92.

115. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 222 reporter's note 2.
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tions does not require special approval, but when a newly independent
state or a state arising from dismemberment wishes to join, the General
Assembly must approve the application.1 16 For example, in 1947, when
Pakistan became a new state separate from British India, it notified the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and requested that the United
117
Nations automatically consider both India and Pakistan as members.
Alternatively, Pakistan sought to gain formal admission to the organization. ll s India inherited the majority of the territory and was viewed as
continuing in the original U.N. seat while Pakistan was admitted
through formal application proceedings." 9 The United Nations General
Assembly ruled that, as a general principle, when a new state is created,
even one that constitutes part of the territory of a member, that state
does not succeed to the right of membership but must apply for admission. 120 New states must follow formal procedures because
[m]embership of any international organization has as its essence a willingness to co-operate in the furtherance of schemes of international solidarity. Such a willingness cannot be assumed on the part of a new [s]tate
whose territory falls within the ambit of these schemes.' 2'
The General Assembly allowed India to retain its seat, proclaiming that
a member state does not cease to be a member simply because its consti1 22
tution or frontier has undergone changes.
III.

CURRENT PRACTICE: THE UNITED STATES VIEW OF TREATY
OBLIGATIONS AFTER DISSOLUTION

In 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. or Soviet
Union) broke into fifteen independent states: the Russian Federation,
three Baltic states, and eleven other republics.' 23 On January 1, 1992,
the U.S.S.R. formally ceased to exist and eleven of the fifteen states
formed a union known as the Commonwealth of Independent States.
116.
117.

UDOKANG, supra note 10, at 283-87.
Id. at 283.

118. Id.
119. Edwin D. Williamson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meet-

ing (Apr. 1-4, 1992), 1992 AM. Soc. INT'L L. 10, 14 [hereinafter Williamson Address].
The U.N. admitted Pakistan through a formal application proceeding and the General
Assembly drew up rules to use in similar cases in the future. Id.
120. UDOKANG, supra note 10, at 287.
121. LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 19, at 65.
122. See UDOKANG, supra note 10, at 287; LAw OF STATE, supra note 19, at 6.

123. Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at A10 [hereinafter Text of Accords].
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Councils of the heads of state and the heads of government of the eleven
member nations"" organized this loose federation which the Baltic states
and Georgia chose not to join. The Commonwealth denies being a successor state to the U.S.S.R. and denies being a "super-state structure. 1 25
Likewise, Russian President Boris K. Yeltsin claims that the Russian
Federation' 26 is not the same state as the former Soviet Union. 12 1
Russia is distinguisable from all the other republics because the government of the Russian Federation alone arguably is a successor government to the Soviet Union. 128 The United States, however, treats Russia

and the non-Baltic republics the same regarding most treaty obligations
of the Soviet Union. The United States treats the treaty obligations of
124. The member states of the Commonwealth are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus
(formerly Byelorussia), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (formerly Kirghizia), Moldavia, Russia,
Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan (formerly Turkmenia), Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. Georgia
and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not joined the Commonwealth. The governing body includes a "Council of the Heads of State" and a "Council
of the Heads of Government." These bodies "shall be set up with a view to tackling
matters connected with coordinating the activities of the states of the new commonwealth
in the sphere of common interests." Id.
125. Id. The role of Commonwealth of Independent States in the international arena
remains undefined. The text of the commonwealth agreement is somewhat vague, stating
that the governing body of the commonwealth "shall be set up with a view to tackling
matters connected with coordinating the activities of the states of the new commonwealth
in the sphere of common interests." The agreement denies that the commonwealth is a
state or a super-state structure. Id. The amount of power given to the Commonwealth
may change as it appears that the federation is trying to establish itself as a quasiEuropean Community by opening up the membership to any states and by pledging
allegiance to cooperate in forming a common Eurasian market.
The agreement holds that the commonwealth is "open, with the agreement of all its
participants, for other states to join" if they "share the goals and principles of the commonwealth." "The allegiance to cooperation in the formation and development of the
common economic space, and all-European and Eurasian markets is being confirmed."

Id.
126. This Note uses the term "Russia" and the phrase "The Russian Federation"
interchangeably. In texts concerning the republics' formation of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Russia refers to itself as a republic under the name of the Russian

Federation, See Text of Declaration: 'Mutual Recognition' and 'an Equal Basis', N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 22, 1991, at A12 [hereinafter Text of Declaration].
On April 17, 1992, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies voted to give "Russia"
and "Russian Federation" co-equal status as the state's official name. Commonwealth
News in Brief, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., May 28, 1992, at 394 [hereinafter
Commonwealth News]; Gregory Gransden, Congress Renames Country Again, UPI,
Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPF File.
127. See Alison Mitchell, Yeltsin, on Summit's Stage, Stresses His Russian Identity,
N.Y. T, Es, Feb. 1, 1992, at A5.
128. See supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
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Baltic states differently because the United States views the incorporation of the Baltics by the Soviet Union as an illegal act." 9
A.

Treaty Responsibilities

The United States presumes that any agreements'"0 in force between
the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the dissolution
remain in effect with respect to all the republics except the Baltic
states. 3 ' In September 1991, United States Secretary of State James A.
Baker outlined the conditions under which the United States would recognize new nations.1 32 One condition was the adherence to international
obligations:
[W]e will welcome into the community of democratic nations those new
political entities who believe in democratic values and follow democratic
practices; who safeguard human rights, including equal treatment of minorities; who respect borders and commit to changes only through peaceful
and consensual means; and who will adhere to international obligations
and to the norms and practices of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter
33
of Paris.
In response to this, in the declaration of Alma Ata establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia and the other Commonwealth
republics agreed to be bound by the international obligations of the Soviet Union.3
129. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
130. This Note uses the terms "international agreement" and "treaty" interchangeably. International law does not distinguish between treaties and other types of agreements. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 301(1) (defining "international agreement"
as used in the Restatement).

131. Williamson Address, supra note 119; Memo to the Honorable Christopher S.
Bond from JinathanE. Stanford, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb. 13, 1992)
[hereinafter Service Memo]. "[Flor example,... aviation and maritime treaties, tax treaties, commerce and navigation treaties, and other such agreements are still in force." Id.

132. James A. Baker, America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has To
Be Done, Address at Princeton University (Dec. 12, 1991) in 2 DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH,
No. 50 [hereinafter Baker Address]. For treaties that the republics have signed with the
United States since the time of the break-up, see IGOR I. KAVASS, CURRENT TREATY
INDEX (11th ed., Fall 1992).
133. Baker Address, supra note 132.

134. Text of Accords, supra note 123, at A10. The text of the agreement reads,
"Member states of the commonwealth guarantee, in accordance with their constitutional
procedures, the fulfillment of international obligations stemming from the treaties and
agreements of the former U.S.S.R." Id.

The agreement mimics all of the Baker requirements and states that the republics are
"seeking to build democratic law-governed states" and that they seek to develop a "re-
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The United States holds Russia and the non-Baltic republics to all

treaties that continue to be relevant, provided that continuation of a
given treaty is consistant with its object and purpose.13 5 This is critical
with respect to treaties concerning Soviet debt and arms control.1 8
Because it is unclear at this time what agreements are in force, the
United States plans to meet with Russia and each republic individually
to determine on a case-by-case basis which agreements warrant modification or termination.1 37 Until that time, the United States will operate
on the assumption that all treaties remain in force.' 38
The Baltic states-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-receive distinctive
treatment for several reasons. First, the Baltics existed as independent
states prior to their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, an action
the United States regarded as illegal and therefore never recognized as a
binding incorporation.' 3 The United States continued to recognize the

spect for human rights and freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, a conscientious fulfillment of commitments and other generally recognized principles and standards of international law" and that they will seek "peaceful settlement of disputes."
The republics agree to recognize and respect "each other's territorial integrity and the
inviolability of the existing borders." Id.
In November 1991 eight of the Republics agreed to assume the debt of the Soviet
Union if necessary. Those states included Russia, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Armenia,
Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia. Francis X. Clines, 8 Soviet Republics Said to Agree to Take on Entire Foreign Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at
A12 [hereinafter 8 Soviet Republics].
135. Telephone Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty
Affairs, United States Department of State (Jan. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Dalton Telephone Interview].
For example, the United States Treaty with the Soviet Union describing the maritime
boundary between the United States and the U.S.S.R. continues to be applicable to Russia but is not relevant to, and therefore does not bind, republics such as Kazakhstan. Id.
For text of the "Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime
Boundary," see Senate Hearing Doc. 101-22, 29 I.L.M. 942, 942-45 (1990), and for
discussion see Senate Hearing Doc. 102-190 and Senate Exec. Rept. 102-13.
Also, the United States continued to hold Russia to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
which imposes trade penalities on states with centrally planned economies and communist ideology that restrict the free emigration of their citizens, even after the fall of the
Soviet Union and its Communist government and after the introduction of a market
economy. United States officials urge that the law should be read as no longer applying
to Russia. John Helmer, Russia, U.S. Still Poles Apart on Trade Treaty, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., May 27, 1992, at 12.
136. See Clines, supra note 134, at A12; Service Memo, supra note 131.
137. Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 113.
138. Id.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 202 reporter's note 6, 210 reporter's note 7.
The United States supported the doctrine of nonrecognition of forcible seizure of terri-
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sovereignty and independence of the Baltic states throughout the Soviet
occupation,"40 and the Baltics maintained diplomats in the United States
throughout this period. 4 Second, the Baltics regained their independence in an act separate from and prior to the later disintegration of the
Soviet Union. 42 Finally, the Baltics were interacting in the international
arena months before the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.' 4 3

tory. At the time of the annexation of the republics, the acting United States Secretary of
State Mr. Sumner Welles, announced that nonrecognition would be applied to the process where "the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic
republics ... were to be deliberately annihilated." Statement by the Acting Secretary of
State, Sumner Welles, reprinted in 3 DEP'T ST. BULL. 48 (1940); see also William J.
Hough, III, Note, The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development of Law ProhibitingForcible Seizure of Territory, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 301, 391 (1985) (providing a history of the Baltic states and the Soviet invasion).
140. Hough, supra note 139, at 408. In 1975, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution declaring the United States would continue to recognize the
independence of the Baltics. Id.
141. Telephone Interview with Mr. Martin Lacis of the Latvian Embassy (Feb. 18,
1993) [hereinafter Lacis Telephone Interview]; Telephone Interview with Mr. Lineas
Orentas of the Lithuanian Embassy (Feb. 18, 1993) [hereinafter Orentas Telephone In-

terview]; Telephone Interview with Mr. Okke Metsmaa of the Estonian Embassy (Feb.
18,1 993) [hereinafter Metsmaa Telephone Interview]; Hough, supra note 139, apps. V
& VI at 498-503 (continuing letters and declaration written by Charge d'Affairs of Lithuania and Latvia and by the Consul General of Estonia in Charge of Legation).
142. Mr. Robert Dalton of the United States Department of State, indicated in a
telephone conversation that the United States views the Baltics gaining of their independence as an event separate from the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union. Dalton
Telephone Interview, supra note 135.
The Baltic republics have distanced themselves from Russia and the other republics by
not joining the Commonwealth. See Francis X. Clines, Gorbachev 'Retirement' Is
Sought, and Leader Is Ready to Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al [hereinafter
Gorbachev "Retirement"]; Georgia Chief Urges Vote on His Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1992, at A6. The Baltic states also refused to have Soviet troops in their capitals. See
World-Wide, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1992, at Al.
143. Alessandra Stanley, Baltic Countries Are Admitted to U.N. Assembly, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at A8. The United States signed memoranda of understanding
concerning diplomatic relations with Estonia on Sept. 4, 1991; Latvia on Sept. 5, 1991,
and with Lithuania on Sept. 6, 1991. See KAVASS, supra note 132, at 169. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Estonia Concerning Diplomatic
Relations, Sept. 4, 1991, CONSOLITATED TREATIES & INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
[CTIA] Dos. 91-178, at 513 [hereinafter Estonian Memorandum]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Latvia Concerning Diplomatic Relations,
Sept. 5, 1991, CTIA Doc. 91-179, at 517 [hereinafter Latvian Memorandum]; and
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Lithuania Concerning
Diplomatic Relations, Sept. 6, 1991, CTIA Doc. 91-180, at 521 [hereinafter Lithuanian
Memorandum]. In these memoranda, the parties agreed to exchange ambassadors.
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The Baltic republics insist their absorption by the U.S.S.R. was illegal
and argue that only those agreements they signed before the 1940 annexation 144 and after gaining independence from -the Soviet Union are
valid. 14 The United States agrees with the Baltic states' position and
does not hold them to the treaty obligations of the Soviet Union. 146 The
United States regards treaties between the Baltic states and the United
States that predate the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union as continuing in force.' 47 As a result, none of the
treaty obligations of the Soviet Union are binding on the Baltic states
unless they voluntarily choose to be bound.148 The United States, therefore, will meet with each state to determine which agreements, if any,
between the Soviet Union and the United States will apply to relations
49
between the United States and the Baltic states.'
B.

Obligations with Respect to Arms Treaties and Debt

The driving force behind United States policy during the Autumn
1991 collapse of the Soviet Union was the United States desire for Russia to maintain control over all of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons?1 °
The conditions under which the United States would recognize new
144. Service Memo, supra note 132. The Restatement, however, interprets the
United States nonrecognition of the annexation as meaning that'the United States would
not regard Soviet agreements that were effective only within the territory of the U.S.S.R.

as binding on the Baltics. However, conventions on human rights and on the law of war,
that generally bound the Soviet Union, are regarded as being binding upon the Baltic
states. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210 reporter's note 7.
145. Officials at the embassies of all three Baltic states confirmed that their states are
not bound by the agreements made by the Soviet Union but that they are all slowly
reviewing the multitude of existing treaties that could apply in their states and are signing on to some of them. Lacis Telephone Interview, supra note 141; Orentas Telephone
Interview, supra note 141; Metsmaa Telephone Interview, supra note 141.
146. Dalton Telephone Interview, supra note 135; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at
§ 210 reporters' note 7.
147. Id. § 202 reporters' note 6.
148. It is assumed that the agreements conferring benefits on the Baltic States will
continue in force. Dalton Telephone Interview, supra note 135. Nevertheless, "Fatherland," the political party of Estonia's new president, Lennart Meri, advocates ridding
Estonia of all vestiges of the Soviet era. Presumably this includes all Soviet treaties.
Briefs: Estonian President See's Larger Role, RUSSIA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L.
REP., Oct. 16, 1992, vol. 3, No. 12 [hereinafter Estonian President].
149. Estonian President, supra note 148. For treaties that the Baltic have signed
with the United States after gaining their independence from the Soviet Union, see KAVASS, supra note 132.
150. Andrew Rosenthal, Arms Issue Drives U.S. Soviet Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1991, at A13.
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states emerging from the Soviet Union included adherence to arms agreements.' 51 Secretary Baker specifically stated to the Commonwealth that
all the republics must abide by the arms agreements' 5 2 as negotiated
with Soviet President Gorbachev.153 The international community
echoed this stance when the United Nations Security Council attempted
to insure stability in the area of nuclear weapons by passing a resolution
54
which bound Russia to the terms of arms treaties the U.S.S.R. signed.'
The situation is complicated by the fact that when the Soviet Union dissolved, four republics possessed strategic nuclear weapons in their territory-Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.155 The United States
implored Yeltsin to control the potentially dangerous situation and to
influence the Commonwealth to uphold disarmament agreements.' 5 6

Russia responded by agreeing to supervise the disarming process."'
The State Department maintains that the arms agreements with the
Soviet Union remain in effect for the four republics possessing stratec
nuclear weapons so long as they continue to possess the weapons.' 5 8 Trie
United States State Department held consultations with the former So-

151. Secretary of State James A. Baker gave an address at Princeton University on
December 12, 1991, emphasizing five principles that constitute preconditions for United
States recognition of governments. Secretary Baker had initially stated these on September 4, 1991, and continued to emphasize these throughout the fall 1991 course of upheaval occurring in the Soviet Union. Baker Address, supra note 132; see Text of Accords, supra note 123, at A10.
152. Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. to Delay Post-Soviet Recognition, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
20, 1991, at A10.
153. Id.; see also Service Memo, supra note 131.
154. The Security Council passed a resolution on January 31, 1992, emphasizing the
need for all member states to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and
disarmament, to adhere to the nonproliferation treaty, and to ratify and implement all
international and regional arms-control arrangements, especially the START and C.F.E.
treaties. Security Council Summit Declaration: 'New Risks for Stability and Security',
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at A4.
155. Steven Erlanger, Concession on Arms Pact Made by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1993, at A8; see Text of Accords, supra note 123, at A10.
156. Text of Accords, supra note 123, at A10.
157. The plan is to first move all the nuclear weapons and eventually destroy them.
See Francis X. Clines, Old Leader and New Discuss Transition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1991, at A8; Elisabeth Rubinfien, Minsk Meeting Sets Nuclear Arms Control, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 31, 1991, at A3.
158. Service Memo, supra note 131. The State Department has been in contact with
the republics to discuss new proposals made after formation of the Commonwealth as

well as arms-control agreements it had negotiated with the Soviet government. Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Considers Move to Cut Multiple-Warhead Missiles, Core of the Nuclear
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at Al, A4.
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viet republics near the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union to assure
continued compliance with these agreements."8 9 The State Department's
legal advisor for treaty affairs stated that all the new states will be parties to multilateral agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) 16 0 and that the existing bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union on military and strategic issues will remain in force as separate
bilateral agreements between the United States and each of the relevant
1 61
former Soviet republics.
Prior to the United States assertion of its position, in the text of the
accord establishing the Commonwealth, the states of the Commonwealth
had agreed to adhere to the international agreements of the Soviet
Union."6 2 Then, in May 1992, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus each agreed to assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union
under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I)... and to effectu-

ate compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible. 6 "
The United States hoped that the republics would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty 6 5 quickly to demonstrate their commitment to controlling

159. Service Memo, supa note 131.
160. Another State Department source, Reginald Bartholomew, the Under Secretary
of State for International Security Affairs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 5, 1992, that Russia would succeed the U.S.S.R. and that the other republics
would file separate instruments of accession to the nonproliferation treaty. Id.
161. Id.
162. Text of Accords, supra note 123; see also Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, U.N. Doc. A/46/771 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
138 (1992) [hereinafter Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth].
163. The treaty is also known as "START I" or the "Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty." For protocol to the START I treaty, see Arms Accord
Recognizes New World, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at A13. Under the terms of
START I, the republics would transfer most of the nuclear weapons to Russia over the
next seven years and remove the remaining weapons under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Celestine Bohlen, Ukraine, Stumbling Block at End of Nuclear Race, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at A5.

164. To comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty's limit on the number of nuclear
weapon-states, Russia will succeed the Soviet Union as the "nuclear-weapons state" and
the other states will become "nonnuclear-weapons states." Under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the number of nuclear-weapons states is limited. See John B. Rhinelander, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting (Apr. 1-4, 1992), 1992 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 7.
165. See Russia Ratifles Nuclear Arms Pact with U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992,

at A8. Arguably, succession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty differs from the rules for
succession to other treaties due to its limitation of the number of states that can possess
nuclear weapons.
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the threat of nuclear military force,' 66 but momentum slowed during
1992. As of April 1993 Russia and the United States had ratified
START I and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,1 7 while the parliaments of
the other two republics had yet to formally approve the two treaties.'",
Until this occurs, the more recent START II treaty, which calls for even
effect even if the
further cuts in nuclear warheads, will not come into
69
legislatures in Moscow and Washington ratify it.1
With respect to debt, the United States maintains that the republics
are jointly and severally liable for the former Soviet Union's debt obligations.' 70 The question remains as to how the republics will pay these
debts. In October 1991 the twelve remaining Soviet republics signed a
tentative agreement to accept joint and several liability for the debt and
to pay it off in proportion to the sizes of their economies. 17 One month
later, Russia made an agreement with seven republics to assume the entire foreign debt of the Soviet Union if necessary.' 7 2 In December 1991
Russia went one step further and agreed to finance the Soviet payroll
and to guarantee Soviet bank credits.' The United States does not want
Russia to take full responsibility for the debt,17 4 and other Western offi-

166. Belarus and the Ukraine had already agreed to join the Non-Proliferation
Treaty through their signature on the agreement establishing the Commonwealth. Text
of Accords, supra note 123.
167. Bohlen, supra note 163, at A5.
168. Id.; Sid Balman, Jr., Nuclear Agreement May Be Pointless," UPI, Dec. 30,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file; Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Chief

Callsfor Nuclear Test Ban,

REUTERS LIBR. REP.,

Jan. 19, 1993. The Ukraine has

been the most vocal in its reluctance to turn over to Russia the nuclear weapons in its
possession. Ukraine is the third largest nuclear power after the United States and Russia
and views the maintenance of nuclear weapons as the best guarantee against Russian
aggression. Ukraine regards Russia as its only potential enemy. Serge Schmemann, Bush
and Yeltsin Sign Pact Making Deep Missile Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993 at A6
[hereinafter Bush and Yeltsin]; Steven Erlanger, Yeltsin Offers Guarantees ifKiev Backs
Arms Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter Yeltsin Offers].

Ukraine is informally using ratification of START I as a bargaining chip in hopes of
receiving guarantees of security, monetary compensation, and environmental assistance
with disposal of the weapons. Id.
169. Yeltsin Offers, supra note 168, at A3; Bush and Yeltsin, supra note 168, at Al.
170. Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 15.
171. See Keith Bradsher, Russia Balking at Liabilityfor the Entire Former Soviet
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at A17 [hereinafter Russia Balking]. The republics
agreed, for example, that if "even all but one republic stopped making payments, the
remaining republic would be liable for the entire debt." Id.
172. Id.; 8 Soviet Republics, supra note 134, at Al.
173. See 8 Soviet Republics, supra note 134, at Al; Service Memo, supra note 119.
,174. Russia Balking, supra note 171, at A17.
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cials have been trying to pressure the other republics into taking some
responsibility for the payment of the debt. 17 5 The United States is trying
to promote the theory that the republics succeeded to the debts of the
former Soviet Union collectively and an equitable portion of the debt
should pass to each republic.' 76 The ultimate allocation of the debt will
depend upon what is found to be equitable by Russia and the other
1
republics. "
The United States will negotiate separately with the Baltics concern-

ing any debt obligations that they may have inherited from the former
Soviet Union. 17 All three Baltic states disclaim any responsibility for the
debts of the former Soviet Union.' The Baltic states' Embassy officials

175. See Keith Bradsher, Talks on Rescheduling Moscow's Debt Pit U.S and Russia
Against Germany, N.Y. TiMS, Sept. 21, 1992, at A9 [hereinafter Talks on

Rescheduling].
176. Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 15.
177. Russia and the other republics may negotiate to shift the entire debt burden to
Russia. Russia has already agreed to repay Ukraine's share of the debt in exchange for
Ukraine's claims to assets held by Russia, such as ownership in overseas embassies. Russia may make similar agreements with the remaining republics. Louis Uchitelle, New
Man, Old Burden: Moscow Owes $86 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A14.
Because equity does not allow the United States to draw up a specific allocation scheme,
the United States can only encourage the republics to reach agreements among themselves. Id.
178. In each of the documents establishing full diplomatic ties with the United
States, the Baltic states agreed that each would enter into negotiations with the United
States to settle promptly any unresolved financial or property matters. The United States
has agreed with each Baltic state that representatives of the states would meet to review
the status of their treaty relations. See Estonian Memorandum, supra note 143, at 513;
Latvian Memorandum, supra note 143, at 517; Lithuanian Memorandum, supra note
143, at 521. In November 1991 eight of the republics agreed that they would take the
entire foreign debt of the Soviet Union if necessary. The Baltics states did not join in this
agreement and are pursuing debt issues separately from the rest of the republics in attempts to garner their own place in the global'economy. 8 Soviet Republics, supra note
134, at Al.
The United States general view on the subject is that when there is a succession of
states, unless the predecessor and successor states have made an agreement as to the
public debt of the predecessor, the responsibility for the debt remains with the predecessor. When part of a state hecomes a separate state, however, the local public debt passes
to the new territory. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 209(2)(a), (c); see also V.C.S.S.P.,
supra note 65.
179. A Lithuanian embassy official indicated that his state has no responsibility for
the debt obligations of the former Soviet Union due to the illegality of the annexation.
Orentas Telephone Interview, supra note 141.
An Latvian embassy official explained that the issue of whether Latvia must assume
any of the former Soviet Union's debts is not completely settled between Russia and
Latvia, although Russia orally agreed that Lativa is not responsible for any debt. In all
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indicated that Russia has agreed with the Baltic states to take full responsibility for the debt, and any negotiation to distribute the debt will
be between Russia and the other republics.'
C.

Membership in the United Nations and Other International
Organizations

Succession to membership in international organizations differs from
succession to other types of international agreements because international organizations have their own governing procedures which take
into account changes in territory or government.' 1 One example is Russia's assumption of the U.S.S.R.'s seat in both the General Assembly and
in the Security Council.' 8 2 Russia accomplished this quite easily-Russian President Yeltsin simply wrote a letter to the U.N. Secretary General notifying him that Russia would take over the Soviet

Union's seat and its other rights and obligations.183 The Commonwealth's agreement that Russia should replace the U.S.S.R. in the U.N.
and in other international organizations facilitated Russia's assumption
of the Soviet Union's position. 8

probability, Russia will not require payment from Latvia in exchange for Latvia's promise not to seek repayment of foreign currency holdings of Latvia industries that the bank
in Moscow seized when Latvia declared its independence from the Soviet Union. Lacis
Telephone Interview, supra note 141.
An Estonian embassy official explained that Estonia denies being responsible for any
debt of the Soviet Union because Estonia has not taken any assets of the former Soviet
Union and Estonia will only accept liabilities if it receives some assets. Metsmaa Telephone Interview, supra note 141.
180. Id.
181. See Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 13.
182. Soviet U.N. Seat Taken by Russia, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1991, at A6 [hereinafter Soviet U.N. Seat]. Russia, upon taking the seat of the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations, automatically assumed the Soviet Union's debt owed to the United Nations. See
Paul Lewis, U.N.'s Fund Crisis Worsens as Role in Security Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

27, 1992, at Al; Paul Lewis, With U.S. the Biggest Debtor, PresidentFinds U.N. Skeptical, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at A14 [hereinafter U.S. the Biggest Debtor].
183. Former Soviet Representative Yuri M. Vorontsov has become the Russian Federation's United Nations representative. Vorontsov said that Russia could automatically
assume this power and there would be no further decisions of any U.N. body required
for Russia to take the position. Soviet U.N. Seat, supra note 182, at A6.
184. The text of the agreement establishing the Commonwealth stated, "[member
states of the commonwealth support Russia in taking over the U.S.S.R. membership in
the United Nations including permanent membership in the Security Council and other
international organizations." Text of Accords, supra note 123.
Since becoming the successor member to the Soviet Union at the United Nations, Rus-

sia has exercised its position by attending a summit of the heads of government of the
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The United States and the other permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council welcomed Russia's assumption of the former
Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council.18 The United States concluded that Russia should occupy the Soviet seat in the Security Council
because it constituted the dominant part of the former Soviet Union in
geographic size, population, resources, and military strength. 8 Moreover, Russia is armed with nuclear weapons and a preeminent military
force-attributes that warranted permanent member status in the first
place. 8 ' France, the United Kingdom, and the United States may not
have wanted to discuss the composition of the Security Council and were
pleased that Russia was willing to assume a leadership position.188
There have been suggestions recently that, considering the world's current balance of power, the UJ.N. should reevaluate the Security Council's
membership.' 8 9 Given the circumstances, these states may have attempted to avoid determining whether Russia was truly a successor gov-

ernment or if the U.S.S.R. had truly ended its legal existence.
Russia inherited the Soviet Union's seat in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, a non-U.N. organization without any formal procedure.1 90 This ease of transition illustrates the international
community's view of Russia as a successor government. 9'
Unlike Russia, the republics can gain membership in international organizations only by individual application. The Commonwealth Repub-

members of the Security Council and by signing agreements deposited with the United
Nations. See Robert D. McFadden, Bush and Yeltsin to Meet After U.N. Parley, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at Al.
See Supplement to U.N. Doc ST.LEG/SER.E/10, XXVII.2(b) for the Russian Federation Acceptance on January 13, 1992, of the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
185. Paul Lewis, 3 Western Powers Favor Russian Takeover of Soviet U.N. Seat,
N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 24, 1992, at A8 [hereinafter 3 Western Powers].
186. Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 14.
187. 3 Western Powers, supra note 185, at A8.
188. See id.
189. Japan and Germany each have expressed a desire to acquire a position on the
Security Council due to their economic strengths. Some critics, however, suggest that
with the unification of Europe only one seat should go to the European Community. Id.
190. Thomas L. Friedman, 10 Ex-Soviet Republics Gain Wider Recognition, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1992, at A6. Russia demonstrated its succession to the Soviet Union's
seat in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by attending a meeting of
the Security Council in January 1992. Id. Russia assumed the seat held by the Soviet
Union. Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth, supra note 162, 31 I.L.M. at 138;
see also Commonwealth News, supra note 126.

191. See infra part IV.C.
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lics have gained membership in the U.N.' 9 2 and in other organizations
1 93
such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The Baltic states each applied for and received admission to the
United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."" Within four months of their admission, the three Baltic states
acceded to, accepted, or signed more than forty treaties, protocols, and
conventions. 95 This suggests that from the perspective of the international organizations, these states have not inherited any standing by virtue of the past membership of the Soviet Union and are only now establishing themselves as legal entities.
The status of Belarus 96 and the Ukraine within the U.N. differs from
that of the other republics because they were participants in the Conference of San Francisco which resulted in the creation of the United Nations, and they have always held their own seats in the General Assembly. 1 97 As a result, the two republics have been able to join U.N.

192. Alessandra Stanley, Baltic Countries are Admitted to U.N. Assembly, N.Y.
TIMFS, Sept. 18, 1991, at A8. In the commonwealth agreement, Byelorussia (now known
as Belarus) and the Ukraine agreed to help the other commonwealth members gain full
membership in the U.N. Text of Accords, supra note 123. The Agreement reads: "The
Republic of Byelorussia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will help other member
states of the commonwealth settle problems connected with their full membership in the
U.N. and other international organizations." Id.
193. Ten states, apart from' the Russian republic, which inherited its membership
from the Soviet Union, belong to the group. Georgia is the only remaining republic
(other than the Baltic states) that has not obtained admission. The induction indicated
the republics' formal acceptance as independent states in the European family of nations.
(The Helsinki Final Act is the group's charter document that established principles on
human rights.) Friedman, supra note 190, at A6.
The republics and Russia recently individually became members of the International
Monetary Fund. The Soviet Union was not a member of that organization. Steven
Greenhouse, Lending Agencies Admit Ex-Soviets as Full Members, N.Y. TIMES, April
28, 1992, at Al.
194. Stanley, supra note 143, at A8; Friedman, supra note 190, at A6. On September 17, 1991, the three Baltic states were admited as new members to the U.N. General
Assembly. See Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth, supra note 162, at 138. The
Baltic states were admitted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on
September 10, 1991. Id.
195. For example, see the Supplement to U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9 as of December 31, 1991, for a list of the actions Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have taken.

196. Formerly known as Byelorussia.
197. Henn-Jiiri Uibopuu, InternationalLegal Personality of Union Republics of
U.S.S.R., 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 833 (1975).
The text of the accord establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States acknowledges that the two republics were members of the United Nations and expressed satisfaction that the two republics would continue to be members as "sovereign independent
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organizations and have ratified or acceded to many conventions over the
years; however, neither of the republics ever became a party to a treaty
without the Soviet Union also becoming a party. 9 ' The two states have
kept their seats in the organization and are continuing parties to agreements already signed through the United Nations. 9 '
IV.

Is

UNITED STATES POLICY CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL

LAW?

A.

Treaty Responsibilities

Whether or not the Soviet Union continues to exist in the personality of
the Russian Federation, binding Russia to the international agreements
agreed to by the former Soviet Union is consistent with international law

as expressed in the V.C.S.S. 2 0 Russia is bound by the former Soviet
Union's treaties if enforcing the treaty would continue to be compatible
with the purpose of the treaty 20 ' and if enforcement of the treaty would
not radically change the conditions for its operation.20 2
For analysis under the Restatement, it is important to determine
whether the Soviet state continued to exist after the dismemberment. If a
state continues to exist, the capacities and duties of this state endure,
regardless of any change in name or ideology.20 3 If there has been cornstates." This language implies that they were not free to make their own decisions in the
United Nations before this time. Text of Accords, supra note 123.
198.

Uibopuu, supra note 197, at 835. The republics were seen as pawns of the

Kremlin and are just now becoming truly independent. It's 'Soviet Mission,' Until Someone Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at A18; 3 Western Powers, supra note 185, at

A8.
The Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics were parties to WHO,
UNICEF, and UNESCO as well as other international organizations. For a complete

listing see Uibopuu, supra note 197, at 833.
199.

Telephone Interview with Ms. Ann Reichel, Treaty Section, United Nations,

Jan. 28, 1993 [hereinafter Reichel Telephone Interview]. Ukraine signed the Protocol to
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes on

November 19, 1991. See Supplement to U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9, supra note 184.
For membership in international organizations other than the United Nations,

Ukraine and Belarus will have to be admitted formally.
200. See V.C.S.S., supra note 2, arts. 34-35, 17 I.L.M. at 1509.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. art. 34, para. 2(b), 17 I.L.M. at 1509.

203. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 208 cmt. a states that the rights and duties of a
state "are not affected by a mere change in the regime or in the form of government or
its ideology." Id.
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plete dissolution of the Soviet Union and replacement by a number of
independent states, none of which have the same legal personality as the
Soviet Union, then Russia receives the same treatment as the other republics and is not bound by any international agreements of the Soviet
Union.2 4
The United States takes the position of universal succession: upon the
change in government, the Russian Federation's government replaced the
government of the Soviet Union. 20 5 A United States government policy
writer recently articulated this position as follows:
The general presumption under international law is that the international agreements between two countries will remain in effect (unless revoked by successor governments) despite changes of regime or boundaries.
The Soviet Union sometimes argued that agreements made by the Czarist
regime were not binding on the U.S.S.R. The United States held, however, that piior agreements (including many dating from the nineteenth
century) were still in force. In practice, the Soviets complied with this
view.2 o6

Russia has assumed the role of a successive government to the former
Soviet government rather than that of a successor to a state that no
longer exists. 20 7 Although the Commonwealth states declared that the

Soviet Union no longer exists as an entity under international law2 08 and

204. Id. § 208 cmts. a, b, and § 210(3).
205. Service Memo, supra note 131.
206. Id.
207. Evidence of this is the United States practice of working with whomever seemed
to be in power. As of December 10, 1991, it was Gorbachev, and by December 12, it was
Yeltsin. Thomas L. Friedman, Gorbachev Rejects Move to DiscardKremlin Role; U.S.
Keeps Link to Moscow, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1991, at Al; Rosenthal, supra note 150, at
A13; World-Wide, supra note 142, at Al.
The United States treated Yeltsin as a successor leader who was inheriting" the same
power that Gorbachev had by keeping close ties and negotiations throughout the time of
transition. See Patrick E. Tyler, Yeltsin Asks Bush to Grant Russians Recognition by
U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1991, at Al.
208. On December 8, 1991, in Byelorussia, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia made a declaration that "that the U.S.S.R., as a subject of international law
and a geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence." Texts of Declarations by 3 Republic
Leaders, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1991, at A8. For the full text of the agreement signed, see
Accord on Commonwealth of Independent States, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at A19.
See also Serge Schmemann, Declaring Death of Soviet Union, Russia and 2 Republics
Form New Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at Al.
The agreement forming the Commonwealth of Independent States included the
phrase, "With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist." Text of Declaration,supra note 126, at A12.
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Yeltsin portrayed himself as a man from a state other than the Soviet
Union,2" 9 what has taken place in effect is merely a change in name and
a passage of power, status, and government structure from what was left
of Gorbachev's Soviet Union to Yeltsin's Russian Federation.'" As each
of the Soviet republics declared their independence from Moscow, the
central authority and government with superpower status remained in
Moscow, which is located in the Russian Republic.2 1' Once it became
apparent that each of the republics would achieve independent status,
Yeltsin, as President of the Russian Republic, took control of the Kremlin's central organization in order to establish himself as the leader, to
gain the support of the international community,2 12 and to secure the
international legal standing of the Soviet Union for Russia.21 3 After as209. Alison Mitchell, supra note 127, at A5. According to a Latvian embassy official, Russian officials alternatively portray Russia as a new state or as the same legal
entity as the Soviet Union depending upon whether Russia chooses to take responsibility
for problems and obligations of the former Soviet Union in particular circumstances.
Lacis Telephone Interview, supra note 141. Russia has apparently seized all overseas
assets of the Soviet Union, such as their embassies, without any offer to equitably distribute the assets with the other republics. Id.; Orentas Telephone Interview, supra note
141.
210. Within minutes of Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation as Soviet President on December 25, 1991, Russia symbolically took the power and responsibilities of the U.S.S.R.
when the briefcase containing the "button" that could be used to launch the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons was handed over to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
the red flag with the hammer and sickle was lowered over the Kremlin and replaced by
the Russian flag. Practically, Russia took over what was left of the Soviet Union's superpower status. Elisabeth Rubinfien, Gorbachev Resigns as Soviet President with Dignity,,
Defiance and Warnings, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 26, 1991, at A3 [hereinafter Gorbachev
Resigns]. The European community has acknowledged Russia is the legal successor to
the Soviet Union. Steven Greenhouse, Europeans Act on Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1991, at A8.
211. Once Yeltsin assumed power, his central authority and control has not shifted
out of Moscow. For a discussion of the transition of power from Gorbachev to Yeltsin,
see Gorbachev Resigns, supra note 210, at A3.
212. United States Secretary of State James A. Baker expressed concern for the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in a divided country, but seemed reassured that
there was much greater stability present in the Soviet Union as compared to Yugoslavia
because "[t]he area is much larger, and we have government here and there is mutual
agreement among them to go their separate ways, which you don't have in Yugoslavia."
This reference to government referred to the control that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin
were keeping over the situation. Keith Bradsher, Noting Soviet Eclipse, Baker Sees Arms
Risks, N.Y. TimESs, Dec. 9, 1991, at A8 [hereinafter Noting Soviet Eclipse].
213. As early as December 1, 1991, Yeltsin took control of the Kremlin's finances by
agreeing with Gorbachev that the Russian Republic would finance the Soviet payroll and
guarantee Soviet state bank credits. See Serge Schmemann, The Soviet Shell; Yeltsin's

Assumption of National Finances Suggests an End to the Kremlin's Authority, N.Y.
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suming control over the state,214 he abolished some of the state structures
of the Soviet Union,2 15 declared support for a different form of government based on democratic principles, and formed a new but loose union
with the states which had just seceded from the former union.2 16 In effect, Yeltsin simply seized the power remaining in Moscow and changed
the form of government.21 The international community has accepted
the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the government and
power of the Soviet Union.21 s
Since the break-up has consisted of the dismemberment of a state and
a succession of governments with the predecessor state continuing to ex-

TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al.
The week before the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed, Yeltsin said
Russia would take over the Kremlin complex of government buildings and signed a series
of decrees to take control over the central agencies of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin signed a
decree absorbing the Soviet Foreign Ministry into the Russian Foreign Ministry, taking
charge of its property and forcing the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A.
Shevardnadze. Other decrees ordered most remaining organs be placed under the Russian government including: the Interior Ministry; Gorbachev's presidential apparatus;
the K.G.B. and its recent offshoot, the Soviet foreign intelligence service. Yeltsin also
appointed a Russian representative to the European Community in Brussels and, reportedly, the Russian flag was flying over the Soviet Embassy in India. Serge Schmemann,
Broad Turnoutfor Republics' Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at A5; Elizabeth
Rubinfien, Gorbachev Slogs on as Political Future Dwindles to What May be a Few
Days, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1991, at A6.
214. As early as the day after the first declaration made by the Commonwealth on
Dec. 12, 1991, news analysts were interpreting Yeltsin's maneuvers as effectively taking
over the Soviet Government and that in most matters, Russia was the Soviet Union.
Celestine Bohlen, The Union is Buried: What's Being Born?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991,
at Al.
215. Yeltsin and Gorbachev met and decided that some of the government agencies
such as the state bank would come under Russian control while others would be abolished. Elisabeth Rubinfien, Gorbachev Agrees to Cede Soviet Structures to Russia,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1991, at A3.
216. The text of the declaration made in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, by the new Commonwealth of Independent States declared that the republics were "[sleeking to build
democratic law-governed states" that will have "respect of state sovereignty and sovereign
equality." Text of Declaration, supra note 126, at A12.
217. United States Secretary of State James A. Baker observed after the first declaration of the republics that the Soviet Union was changing in form but the center of control
remained. Noting Soviet Eclipse, supra note 212, at A8.
218. On December 24, 1991, the Russian republic notified the U.N. that it was
going to take over the Soviet Union's seat in the Security Council and all of its other
rights and obligations in the organization, and by February, Yeltsin was at the first
meeting of the heads of government of the Security Council members. Soviet U.N. Seat,
supra note 182, at A6; Paul Lewis, Secretary General Asked to Make Proposals on
Averting Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at Al.
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ist, the traditional view of succession of states in the V.C.C.S. 219 and the
Restatement 220 indicate that Russia should continue to be bound by all
treaties the Soviet government signed unless a fundamental change of
circumstances has made the agreement inapplicable, 22 1 and, therefore,
the United States policy is consistent with international law.
There is no overriding consensus under international law as to
whether the non-Russian republics should be bound by the former Soviet
Union's treaties. The United States practice of arguing that treaties are
binding upon the republics is inconsistent with the Restatement which
calls for new states to receive a clean slate 222 and have the option to
become party to the international agreements.2 23 Current practice is also
inconsistent with customary practice. Relying on international law as evidenced through custom, the fourteen non-Russian republics should not
be bound by the Soviet Union's personal treaties.2 2 4 Their only obligations should arise out of dispositive treaties, such as arms control treaties,
and by their own election to be bound.
Conversely, under the provisions of the V.C.S.S., the new states would
continue to be bound by the Soviet Union's treaties if a treaty was in
force for that part of the territory at the time of succession, unless the
states agreed otherwise, or if the treaty was incompatible with the object
of the treaty, or if conditions for the operation of the treaty changed
radically.2 25

219. V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 35, 17 I.L.M. at 1509.
220. Russia is bound by the rights and obligations of the Soviet Union because there
has been a succession of government. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 208 reporters'

note 2.
The Soviet Union challenged the distinction between succession of governments and
succession of states after the October Revolution of 1917. The new government argued
that it was a new state and was not bound by the obligations of Czarist Russia, including
its debt. The United States held that the prior agreements were still in force and the
Soviets complied with this view. Id.; Service Memo, supra note 131.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04 (discussing the difference between
successive states and successive governments); see also HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
490.

222.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 3, § 210(3).

223. Section 210(3) of the Restatement states:
When part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not succeed to the
international agreements to which the predecessor state was party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts such agreements and the other party or parties
thereto agree or acquiesce.
Id. With multilateral conventions, notice is sent to the depositary and the consent of the
other parties is presumed. Id. cmt. g.
224. See supra notes 86, 91-92, 96-99 and accompanying text.
225. This does not apply if:
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The analysis of whether the Baltic states should be treated the same as
the other non-Russian republics regarding international obligations
hinges on the legal status of these states. Assuming the former Soviet
rule over the Baltics was legal, the analysis that determined the obligations of the non-Baltic republics applies. Conversely, if the Soviet Union
exercised illegal control of the Baltics, then the states should not be
bound by actions taken by the Soviet Union.2 26
The United States disregards the time during which the Baltics were a
part of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States disregards Soviet actions which would otherwise have created international obligations
for the Baltics.2 27 Assuming illegal occupation, it is consistent with international law to bind the Baltic states to agreements made by the Soviet
Union.228
B.

Obligations With Respect to Arms Treaties and Debt

International arms control agreements and public debts arguably are
dispositive agreements that attach to the territory, and their obligations
therefore remain regardless of changes in the ruling power over that territory. 229 Both the V.C.S.S. and the Restatement find dispositive treaties
binding regardless of what party is in power. The Restatement states
that "territorial agreements" continue to be binding regardless of rules
governing state succession to other types of international agreements.2"'
The V.C.S.S. makes similar reference to obligations relating to the use of
territory that will benefit other states or all states."' Therefore, the
United States position that all of the states of the former Soviet Union
are bound by arms agreements is in accordance with international law of
dispositive treaties.

(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the
treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.
V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 34, 17 I.L.M. at 1509.
226. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210 reporter's note 7.
227. The Baltics get a clean slate by the United States. See supra notes 139-49 and
accompanying text. Prior to the Baltic states' independence from the Soviet Union, the
United States maintained diplomatic relations with each of them. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 202 reporter's note 6.
228. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210 reporter's note 7.
229. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
230. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 210(4).

231. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; V.C.S.S., supra note 2, art. 12,
para. 2(a), 17 I.L.M. at 1494-95.
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Under the Restatement, the new states may inherit any local public
debt of the Soviet Union if it owed that debt to another state, to an
international organization, or to private foreign sources.2" 2 Generally, a
state that incurs a public debt retains responsibility for it as long as that
state continues to exist.23 3 If so much territory is lost through fragmentation that enforcement of the entire debt against the remaining state
would be unfair, the debt should be apportioned among the remaining
that have come into existence on the territory of
state and the new2 3 states
4
the former state.
Under the V.C.S.S.P., 3 5 Russia and the new republics must agree to
some type of equitable distribution of the public debt of the former Soviet Union, taking into account whether the republics are being given
any property rights of interests associated with the debt.23 6
The United States takes the position that the republics should divide
the debt of the former Soviet Union equitably23 7 although only Russia
and seven other republics agreed to shoulder the foreign debt.23 The
agreement on debt repayment, signed one month before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, calls for the republics to be jointly and severally liable. 23" Every republic except Russia recently stopped making payments, so now Russia is being held liable for the entire debt. 240 Debt
negotiations with the Western states focus on Russia due to its willingness to work toward payment of the Soviet Union's debt, but other industrialized states are pressuring the other republics to help. 4 Ukraine
acknowledged its debt and reached an agreement with Russia to release
its claims to Soviet assets in exchange for Russia's assumption of the
242
Ukraine's portion of the Soviet debt.
The United States position is that equitable distribution of the Soviet
Union's debt is consistent with the available evidences of international

232. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 209(2)(c) cmt. b.
233. Id. § 209 cmt. e.
234. Id. § 209 reporter's note 6. This occurred with the dismemberment of the Aus-

tro-Hungarian Empire. See V.C.S.S.P., supra note 65.

235. Id.
236. Id. arts. 40(1), 41, 22 I.L.M. at 324.
237. Williamson Address, supra note 119.

238. 8 Soviet Repubics, supra note 134, at Al.
239. Id.
240. Russia Balking, supra note 171, at A17.
241. Talks on Rescheduling, supra note 175, at A9.
242. Uchitelle, supra note 177. It is currently unclear if the Baltic States will be
held responsible for any of the foreign debt of the Soviet Union. See supra notes 178-80
and accompanying text.

1993]

DISSOLUTION OF SOVIET UNION

law. Because Russia inherited the vast portion of the Soviet Union, Russia will be held responsible for the largest portion of the debt. The other
republics may negotiate to exchange their debt responsibility for relinquishment of claims they have against Soviet property.24 3
It appears that the United States does not seek partial repayment from
the Baltics for the Soviet foreign debt. 4 4 This position is inconsistent
with international law which requires an equitable distribution of the
debt if the Baltics now own local property rights or interests that have
attached debt.245 However, if the Baltics will not receive any property
interests or rights in return for taking a portion of the Soviet Union's
debt, then not holding these states liable is consistent with international
law.
To the extent that the benefits of the debt assisted the area and encouraged its development, the Baltics should be held responsible for the
local public debt. The United States should argue that debt runs with
land, but it should make exceptions to this rule based on the legitimacy
of the government in power.
C. Membership in the United Nations and Other International
Organizations
The current practice of allowing the Russian Federation to retain the
positions in the U.N. and other international organizations previously
occupied by the former U.S.S.R. is consistent with the custom of these
organizations because the legal personality of the U .S.S.R. survived its
changes in government, name, and territorial boundaries.24 6 Moreover,
in the agreement forming the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
republics agreed that Russia should take the place of the U.S.S.R. in the
United Nations and other international organizations.24 The Russian
Federation obtained the seat of the Soviet Union in part because of the
agreement of the Commonwealth states, but more importantly because
the United Nations viewed Russia as the same state as the Soviet
243. This is the opinion of Latvian Embassy official, Mr. Martin Lacis. Lacis Telephone Interview, supra note 141; see also Uchitelle, supra note 177.
244. See Williamson Address, supra note 119; Russia Balking, supra note 171, at
A17.
245. See Williamson Address, supra note 119, at 15.
246. When India was allowed to keep the United Nations seat British India held
and Pakistan was required to be formally admitted into the organization, this was in
accordance with the devolution agreement between these two states and the United Kingdom, which stated that all international organization memberships would devolve to India. Id.
247. Text of Accords, supra note 123, at A10.
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Union.2 48 If it were not the same state with the same legal personality,
then Russia would have had to apply for United Nations membership in
its own right.249
The policy of the U.N. and other organizations, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, requiring individual application of the new states is consistent with all sources of international law
allowing each organization to develop its own membership rules. Consistent with international law and past procedure of the U.N., the new
republics and the Baltic states are required to go through formal admission procedures to become members of the United Nations and other
international organizations.2 50
V.

CONCLUSION

The reaction of the international community toward the treaty obligations of the republics that resulted from the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union is establishing what will become customary international precedent for many years to come. The magnitude of the break-up
and the number and power of the parties involved increase the precedential value of the Soviet dissolution. Before the dismemberment, no generally accepted international law existed on the subject of treaty obligations
with respect to treaty succession. After the diplomatic process between
the United States and the republics is complete, customary international
law will shift from supporting the law as written in the Restatement to
supporting the position embodied in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. In the case of dismemberment and
the survival of the predecessor state, treaties will continue in force for the
surviving state and will be binding on the new states as well.
The United States will evaluate treaty obligations one at a time with
each of the individual republics, making sure that each state knows its
rights and obligations. The United States made it clear that Russia and
the republics would be held to international arms-control treaties and

248. In a telephone conversation with Ms. Ann Reichel of the United Nations' Legal
Department, she stated that as far as the United Nations was concerned, the Russian

Federation is the same state as the Soviet Union but with a name change. Concerning the
treaties that the Soviet Union signed at the U.N., Russia is considered to be the signatory. There has been no more fanfare than if a state had decided to change its name. See
Reichel Telephone Interview, supra note 199.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
250. The exception to this is Belarus and the Ukraine. Each of these states gained
membership in the United Nations upon its formation. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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other treaties that involve significant national security interests.
Russia and the republics are responsible for the debt of the Soviet
Union. The need for international peace and economic stability necessitated this stricter course. The United States was forced to encourage the
republics' responsibility to satisfy the concerns of the rest of the world in
a time of transition and potential instability.
Since the United States and the Soviet Union created and engaged in
the nuclear arms race, the break-up of one party increased the potential
for a power vacuum that could have been filled with chaos. To combat
that potential danger, the United States leaders worked to insure stability by helping to keep a strong force in the Kremlin and by working
with the leader who seemed to be in control. The Baker approach of
laying down principles that the republics had to follow to gain recognition was an especially effective catalyst to the agreement between the
Commonwealth states. The republics accepted the obligations in large
part because both the republics and the United States knew that there
was not much choice but to accept the treaty obligations if the new republics desired recognition. Moreover, by taking immediate responsibility for the obligations of the Soviet Union, the republics are able to take
advantage of the accompanying treaty rights. The republics have enjoyed
almost immediate acceptance into the international community of states
and are reaping benefits from their actions in the form of aid and concessions on debt repayments from the rest of the world. While Russia has
inherited the superpower status of the Soviet Union, the other republics
have gotten some of the status through the loosely structured
Commonwealth.
While the United States has not demonstrated that it has acted solely
out of a feeling of obligation to adhere to international law in evaluating
what treaty obligations shall bind the republics, the United States decision to follow the universal succession theory was actually the best policy
given the circumstances of uncertainty and the goals of promoting stability. Moreover, it was wise for the United States not only to demand
acceptance of treaty obligations, but also to soften that stance once the
republics acquiesced. Now that the republics will be sitting down with
the United States on a one-to-one basis, they can forge closer relations
which will lead to better mutual understanding in the future. Perhaps
the United States treatment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union will
help to more clearly define international law because of the important
position in world affairs occupied by the United States and the Soviet
state in prior to its dissolution.
Lucinda Love

